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Abstract	
This	article	develops	a	critical	engagement	with	the	politics	of	British	satire.	After	first	engaging	
the	mainstream	critique	of	satire—that	it	promotes	cynicism	and	apathy	by	portraying	politicians	
in	stereotypically	corrupt	terms—we	develop	a	performative	approach	to	comedy	as	an	everyday	
vernacular	of	political	 life.	Beyond	a	focus	on	 ‘impact’,	we	suggest	that	satire	can	be	read	as	an	
everyday	form	of	political	reflection	that	performs	within	a	social	context.	This	yields	an	image	of	
Morris,	 Iannucci	and	Brooker	as	 important	critics	of	contemporary	British	politics,	a	point	which	
we	explore	through	their	interventions	on	media	form,	political	tragedy	and	political	agency.		
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	“…the	world	has	changed	and	so	has	political	comedy	and	satire.	The	rise	
of	 the	 24/7	media	machine	with	 ever	more	 pressure	 on	 ratings	 combined	
with	the	rich	pickings	offered	by	mass	market	DVDs	and	large-scale	arena	
tours	has	fuelled	a	transition	best	captured	in	David	Denby’s	notion	of	the	
change	 ‘from	 satire	 to	 snark’.	 The	 latter	 being	 snide,	 aggressive,	
personalized:	‘it	seizes	on	any	vulnerability	or	weakness	it	can	find	–	a	slip	of	
the	tongue,	a	sentence	not	quite	up-to-date,	a	bit	of	flab,	a	flash	of	boob,	a	
blotch,	 a	 wrinkle,	 an	 open	 fly,	 an	 open	 mouth,	 a	 closed	 mouth’,	 but	 all	
designed	to	reinforce	the	general	view	that	politics	is	failing	and	politicians	
are	bastards.”	(Flinders	2013)		
	
Introduction	
Recent	years	have	seen	a	growing	scepticism	towards	the	role	of	satire	in	British	political	life.	This	
view,	 which	 has	 been	 expressed	 across	 policy	 circles,	 the	media,	 and	 academia,	 suggests	 that	
making	fun	of	politicians	and	political	parties	can	foster	a	cynicism	and	apathy	amongst	citizens	
that	 diminishes	 healthy	 political	 engagement	 (Fielding	 2014a,	 2014b,	 2012).	 In	more	 sweeping	
variants,	 a	 norm	 of	 subversion,	 especially	 snark,	 within	 the	 public	 sphere	 is	 taken	 as	 (at	 least)	
permissive	of	a	‘hollowing	out’	of	political	 life	(Denby	2010;	Flinders	2013).	A	kind	of	‘post-truth’	
malaise	emerges	whereby	politicians	themselves	–	most	notably	Boris	Johnson	-	are	able	to	profit	
from	an	increasingly	symbiotic	relationship	with	satire	(Coe,	2013;	Iannucci	2015,	2016).	The	once	
cutting	 edge	 of	 British	 satire	 is	 not	 only	 blunted,	 but	 actively	 turned	 to	 the	 ends	 of	 a	 de-
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politicised,	 spectacular	 form	 of	 politics	 where	 gesture,	 form,	 personality	 and	 humour	 trump	
engagement,	deliberation,	transparency	and	accountability.		
While	 sympathetic	 to	 this	 view,	 not	 least	 for	 underlining	 the	 political	 significance	 of	
comedy,	we	develop	a	critical	engagement	that	extends	in	a	more	performative	direction	(Butler,	
2010).	Although	satire	has	certainly	grown	in	significance	and	circulation	within	British	politics,	we	
argue	 that	 the	 political	 analysis	 of	 comedy	 should	 not	 be	 reduced	 to	 an	 instrumental	 logic	 of	
‘impact’,	 but	 can	 also	 entertain	 the	 plural	 possibilities	 and	 limits	 that	might	 be	 in	 a	 process	 of	
construction	 and	 change.	 As	 Julie	 Webber	 (2013:	 7)	 observes:	 ‘few	 political	 science	 scholars	
examine	political	comedy,	and	when	they	do,	they	ask	an	outdated	disciplinary	question:	does	it	
promote	 civic	 engagement?	 Or	 does	 it	 make	 citizens	 cynical	 toward	 government?’	
Straightforwardly,	 there	 is	 more	 to	 critical	 politics	 than	 parliament,	 parties,	 politicians,	 and	
elections.	Part	of	the	argument	against	contemporary	satire	seems	to	imply	that	the	resolution	of	
public	engagement	via	the	state	form	of	politics	is	straightforwardly	the	best	option.	On	this	view,	
satire	 either	 supports	 the	 process	 of	 resolution,	 or	 not.	 But	 rather	 than	 begin	 with	 this	 fixed	
understanding	of	what	politics	‘is’,	to	which	comedy	is	then	‘added’,	we	think	it	is	more	productive	
to	 ask:	 how	 does	 satire	 conceive	 of	 politics?	 What	 possibilities	 and	 limits	 are	 performed?	
Rejecting	the	 idea	that	satire	should	work	as	an	 instrumental	 force	that	 influences	the	world	of	
politics	 (for	good	or	 ill),	we	develop	a	performative	approach	that	engages	political	satire	on	 its	
own	terms,	as	a	far	more	contested	and	insurrectional	domain.		
Broadly	speaking,	we	question	the	objective	separation	between	a	domain	of	culture	on	
the	one	hand,	and	a	domain	of	politics	on	the	other,	in	order	to	develop	a	conception	of	satire	as	
an	everyday	vernacular	of	political	life	(Brassett,	2015).	Comedy	is	not	‘good’	or	‘bad’	for	politics.	
Comedy	 is	 politics.	 Anthropologists	 have	 long	 understood	 that	 small	 things	 like	 laughing	 at,	
subverting,	 or	 otherwise	 ridiculing	 elements	 of	 political	 life	 suggest	 an	 important	 everyday	
agency	for	reflection	and	critique	(Scott	1987).	But	what	this	agency	does	or	does	not	do,	or	what	
it	is	used	for,	and	by	whom,	are	entirely	open	questions.	The	interesting	point	for	us	is	that	British	
satire	exists	as	a	vernacular	record	of	political	thought	 in	 its	own	right:	 it	raises	questions	about	
the	state	form	of	politics,	suggests	radical	 limits	in	the	mediatisation	of	political	 life,	and	can,	in	
certain	 circumstances,	 anticipate	novel	ways	 in	which	political	 agency	might	be	 changing.	 This	
has	 implications	 for	 the	 study	of	political	 comedy	which	go	beyond	 the	objective	orthodoxy	of	
audience	studies,	to	anticipate	how	satire	works	as	an	everyday	language	of	politics.		
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Satire	is	fundamentally	situated	in	the	social	relations	that	it	seeks	to	criticise	and,	as	such,	
the	performance	can	both	critique	and	embody	the	problems	and	contradictions	of	that	society.	
This	is	not	necessarily	‘direct’	in	the	sense	that	the	satirist	intends,	because	these	contradictions	
manifest	 –	 in	 part	 -	 through	 the	 performance	 itself.	 Thus,	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 satirical	
performance	 is	 not	 pre-determined	 and	 should	 not	 be	 treated	 as	 a	 ‘closed’	 event.	 Rather,	 the	
manifestation	of	these	contradictions	through	the	performance	is	open-ended	and	the	satire	can	
develop	 its	 form	 of	 critique	 in	 unintended	 directions.	 We	 therefore	 recognise	 an	 important	
ambiguity	 in	 the	 politics	 of	 comedy	 that	 others	 have	 identified,	 which	 is	 that	 it	 can	 as	 easily	
uphold,	as	well	as	critique,	established	forms	of	hierarchy	and	exclusion	(Critchley,	2002).	While	
certain	jokes	can	reveal	the	instability	and	violence	of	nation	or	gender,	say,	others	can	serve	to	
entrench	such	exclusionary	tropes	through	stereotype	or	humiliation.	A	turn	to	comedy	is	not	an	
‘escape’	from	the	hard	questions	of	politics	(Brassett,	2009).	Good	satire	can	serve	to	tranquilise	
critique,	distract	from	moral	dilemmas,	or	else,	empower	a	certain	(masculine)	worldly	cynicism.	
But	such	ambiguities	in	the	performative	politics	of	satire	are,	for	us,	an	acute	question	of	ethics	
and	agency	that	should	be	foregrounded	and	engaged.		
This	argument	is	developed	over	three	sections.	Section	1	engages	the	dominant	critique	
of	British	satire.	While	we	draw	inspiration	from	the	argument	that	comedy	has	an	important	role	
to	 play	 in	 politics,	 we	 question	 the	 idea	 that	 satire	 should	 work	 ‘as	 a	 corrective’,	 or	 ‘an	
ameliorative’	 for	 politics,	 i.e.	 holding	 politicians	 to	 account.	 Instead,	 we	 make	 the	 case	 for	 a	
performative	 approach	 which	 foregrounds	 the	 ambiguity	 and	 instability	 of	 comedy.	 Section	 2	
therefore	asks:	what	does	satire	do?	What	narratives	of	politics	and	political	does	it	 instantiate?	
Here	 we	 trace	 a	 critical	 line	 through	 the	 work	 of	 Chris	Morris,	 Armando	 Iannucci,	 and	 Charlie	
Brooker.	These	satirists	mark	an	interesting	case	selection	because	they	each	share	elements	of	
the	mainstream	critique	of	a	‘hollowing	out’	of	politics,	yet	they	each	take	the	critique	in	different	
directions.	This	yields	variously	an	attempt	to	subvert	the	narration	and	visual	representation	of	
politics	 in	 news	media	 (Morris),	 a	meditation	 on	 the	 tragic	 figure	 of	 the	 state	 form	 of	 politics	
(Iannucci),	 and	a	more	 radical	 questioning	of	 the	 site	of	 politics	 and	political	 agency	 (Brooker).	
Finally,	in	Section	3,	we	draw	these	points	together	to	argue	that	satire	can	provide	an	important	
everyday	commentary	on	the	site	and	nature	of	politics,	raising	questions	over	the	state	form	of	
global	capitalism;	the	language	of	political	engagement;	and	the	nature	of	political	agency.	This	
disaggregation	 of	 the	 substantive	 content	 of	 satire	 suggests	 (for	 us)	 some	 productive	 lines	 of	
extension	 that	 include	 –	 inter	 alia	 -	 a	 generalisation	 of	 satirical	 literacy,	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 ‘self-
satirising’	 politician,	 and	 the	 radical	 potential	 of	 ‘citizen	 satire’.	 Neither	 a	 resolution,	 nor	 an	
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escape:	the	proliferation	of	satire	as	an	everyday	vernacular	can	be	understood	as	an	incitement	
to	politics,	not	its	denouement.		
	
1. The	politics	of	satire	
As	the	Introduction	suggested,	an	influential	view	associates	British	satire	with	the	potential	for	
an	 excessive	personal	 critique	of	 politicians	 and	a	 negative	 view	of	 political	 possibility.i	While	 a	
popular	line	of	thought,	this	critique	emerges	from	a	venerable	set	of	critical	arguments	that	seek	
a	 ‘renewal’	 of	 politics,	 to	 encourage	 trust	 and	 participation	 in	 the	 British	 political	 process,	
following	a	general	observation	 that	politics	 “is	not	all	 that	 it	was	once	cracked	up	 to	be”	 (Hay	
2007:1).	On	 this	 view,	 satire	 can	be	 read	as	 encouraging	apathy,	or	worse,	 legitimating	a	more	
general	turn	away	from	representative	politics,	most	eloquently	expressed	in	the	work	of	Fielding	
(2011,	2012;	2014a;	2014b).	 ‘Comedy,’	Fielding	 (2011)	argues,	 ‘has	always	 relied	on	stereotypes.	
There	was	a	time	when	the	Irish	were	thick;	the	Scots	were	careful	with	money;	mothers-in-law	
fierce	 and	 ugly;	 and	 the	 Welsh	 stole	 and	 shagged	 sheep.	 The	 corrupt	 politician	 is	 one	 such	
stereotype,	 one	 that	 is	 neither	 racist	 nor	 sexist	 and	 seemingly	 acceptable	 to	 all.’	However,	 the	
effect	 of	 this	 stereotype	 is	 to	 diminish	 the	work	 that	 the	 audience	has	 to	do:	 it	 diminishes	 the	
deliberative	potential	of	satire.	As	he	surmises:		
‘…the	impression	that	comedy	gives	us	about	our	representatives	as	a	class	–	that	they	are	
morally	 inferior	 to	 the	 rest	 of	 us	 –	is	 just	wrong.	 It	 is	 however	 a	 convenient	 view,	 for	 it	
means	we,	the	audience,	the	voters,	are	not	to	blame	for	anything:	we	are	not	responsible	
because	we	are	the	victims	of	a	politics	gone	wrong.’	(Fielding,	Ibid.)		
While	sympathetic	to	this	argument,	not	least	for	drawing	attention	to	the	political	importance	of	
satire	and	 its	 capacity	 to	 lapse	 into	 stereotypes	 that	 tranquilise	 rather	 than	agitate,	we	seek	 to	
develop	 a	 performative	 conception	 of	 satire	 as	 an	 everyday	 language	of	 politics.	 This	 emerges	
from	 a	 critique	 of	 the	 idea	 that	 comedy	 ‘should’	 be	 seen	 as	 an	 instrumental	 force,	 something	
which	 is	 ‘added	 onto’	 politics	 to	 correct	 its	 failings.	 Instead,	 comedy	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 an	
inherent	 element	 in	 the	 cultural-political	 discourse	 of	 society.	We	 therefore	 seek	 to	 license	 an	
approach	to	satire	that	treats	it	as	a	productive	area	of	political	thought	in	its	own	right.		
	
The	critique	of	satire	
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In	 a	 widely	 circulated	 blog,	 Matt	 Flinders	 (2013)	 remarked	 “there	 has	 been	 a	 groundswell	 of	
opinion	against	political	comedy	and	satire	as	evidence	grows	of	 its	social	 impact	and	generally	
negative	 social	 influence	 (especially	 over	 the	 young).”	 This	 lament	 for	 younger	 people	 was	
primarily	targeted	at	the	rise	of	Russell	Brand,	however,	Flinders	considered	that	there	was	more	
going	on:	“in	recent	years	the	nature	of	political	comedy	and	satire	has	derived	great	pleasure	and	
huge	profits	from	promoting	corrosive	cynicism	rather	than	healthy	scepticism.”	He	draws	from	
authors	 like	 Denby	 (2010)	 to	 argue	 that	 satire	 has	 become	 two	 dimensional	 in	 recent	 years,	
hitting	the	easy	targets	and	generating	a	bit	of	controversy	along	the	way,	e.g.	Sandy	Toksvig’s	
reference	 to	Michael	Gove	 as	 having	 a	 face	 like	 a	 pickled	 embryo.	 For	 Flinders,	 any	 ‘nostalgic’	
attempts	to	license	such	offense	by	invoking	the	tradition	of	Swift	should	begin	to	face	up	to	the	
fact	that	as	numerous	comedians	themselves	now	admit,	it	is	part	and	parcel	of	the	“destructive	
nature	 of	modern	 humour”.	 The	 impression	 given	 is	 that	 political	 satire	 has	 become	 a	 largely	
conservative	 force:	 as	 he	 surmises,	 “my	 question	 is	 really	 whether	 satire	 continues	 to	 play	 a	
positive	social	role	that	helps	explain	just	why	politics	matters?”		
On	this	view,	even	the	apparently	worthy	and	committed	critique	of	comedians	like	Brand,	
but	 also	 Jon	 Stewart	 in	 the	 US,	 may	 actually	 contribute	 to	 a	 broader	 retreat	 from	 politics	 by	
associating	too	closely	with	a	tradition	of	comedy	that	assures	voters	that	politics	is	all	about	self-
interest,	back	stabbing,	and	negativity	(Baym	2010:	111;	Baym	&	Jones	2012:13;	See	also	Young,	
2015).ii	Interestingly,	this	 is	a	view	of	satire	that	 is	widely	shared	in	policy	and	media	circles.	For	
example,	Alastair	Campbell,	Tony	Blair’s	 former	Director	of	Communications	and	Strategy,	 is	 a	
strident	 critic	 of	 Armando	 Iannucci	 for	 providing	 a	 ‘cartoon	 caricature’	 of	 ‘venal’,	 ‘self-serving	
politicians’	 in	a	way	that	distracts	from	how	‘politics	has	delivered	most	of	the	great	things	that	
have	happened	in	the	world	in	its	history’	(2009).iii	In	a	more	nuanced	line,	authors	like	Jonathan	
Coe	(2013)	and	Will	Davies	(2016)	have	lamented	the	way	satire	has	become	a	weakened	force	in	
British	politics	due	to	its	regular	interaction	with	politicians	like	Boris	Johnson	and	Nigel	Farage.	
By	allowing	them	to	partake	in	the	audience	friendly	mocking	that	satire	has	become,	the	critical	
foil	 has	 been	 blunted	 and	 we	 are	 left	 with	 little	 more	 than	 a	 media	 relay	 that	 privileges	
entertainment	over	accountability.	Far	 from	the	Swiftian	 ideal,	 they	argue,	we	must	 remember	
the	darker	warning	of	Peter	Cook	that:	“Britain	is	in	danger	of	sinking	giggling	into	the	sea.”				
While	 a	 popular	 and	broadly	 shared	 critique	of	 satire,	 this	 argument	 also	 chimes	with	 a	
deeper	analysis	of	political	disenchantment	in	politics,	whether	with	the	liberal	democratic	form	
of	 government	 (Pharr	 &	 Putnam	 2000),	 or	 society	 itself	 (Putnam	 2000),	 but	 most	 notably	
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observed	 in	British	politics	by	Colin	Hay	 (2007).	Hay	 (2007:161)	 argues	 that	we	 should	 consider	
“the	 cumulative	 consequences	of	 the	assumptions	we	project	on	 to	politics	 and	political	 actors	
before	we	plump	 for	 them”	and	 that	 “we	 should	politicise	 such	assumptions	and	 seek	 to	make	
them	the	subject	of	political	deliberation.”	Here	the	fillip	of	engagement	is	left	on	the	table	as	a	
strategic	option.		
For	Hay,	political	disaffection	can	 lead	to	a	norm	of	disengagement	and	the	 longer	term	
nurturing	of	apathy.	The	solution	proposed	is	a	form	of	renewal,	whereby	political	processes	must	
be	more	visibly	deliberative,	where	internal	discussions	and	decision-making	processes	are	more	
transparently	available.	If	this	were	to	occur	we	might	dispel	the	‘myth’	that	politicians	are	in	it	for	
themselves	and	people	would	come	to	see	that	parliamentary/representative	politics	could	be	a	
vehicle	for	social	and	political	progress	once	more.	 In	a	world	of	soundbites	and	gesture	politics,	
where	people	have	been	asked	to	focus	on	the	personality	of	the	politician,	a	negative	judgement	
of	that	person	can	all	too	easily	blend	into	a	negative	view	and,	indeed,	a	distrust	of	politics	more	
generally.	
British	 satire	 would	 appear	 to	 be	 directly	 susceptible	 to	 this	 critique.	 Rather	 than	
politicising	globalisation	discourses	or	the	rise	of	personality	politics,	satire	can	all	too	easily	mock	
politicians	 for	 their	 uncritical	 reproduction	 of	 such	 logics.	 In	 a	 sophisticated	 critique	 of	 the	The	
Thick	 Of	 It,	 Steven	 Fielding	 (2014b:	 344)	 argues	 that	 the	 program	 merely	 reflects	 audience	
prejudice	about	politicians,	thus	providing	an	“intensification	of	the	fictional	association	of	politics	
with	corruption”.	In	other	words,	far	from	providing	a	new	insight	into	politics,	this	form	of	satire	
is	 simply	 another	manifestation	of	 a	 growing	disengagement.	Rather	 than	 invigorating	 and	 re-
engaging	with	political	 and	 social	 life,	 it:	 “…has	done	 little	more	 than	pander	 to	our	prejudices	
about	politicians.	For,	as	survey	after	survey	reveals,	most	of	us	don't	like	MPs	much,	feel	they	lie	
and	suspect	 they	are	corrupt	–	although	other	 research	shows	we	don't	know	much	about	how	
politics	works.	The	series	takes	the	brave	stand	of	confirming	what	we	already	think	we	know.”	
(Fielding,	2012).	
On	 this	 view,	 Fielding	 argues,	 The	 Thick	 Of	 It	 provides	 a	 disarming	 negativity:	 ‘A	more	
depressing	example	of	the	failure	of	political	action	and	communication	it	is	hard	to	find,	and	one	
in	which	all	parties	are	at	 fault,	 trapped	 in	 their	 conflicting	 logics…’	 (2014a:261).	 It	would	 seem	
that	 Iannucci,	 who	 is	 an	 outspoken	 critic	 of	 the	 decline	 of	 principles	 like	 truth	 and	 fairness	 in	
politics,	has	unwittingly	produced	a	monster	that	confirms	that	very	problem:	“Politicians	are	still	
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obsessed	with	 the	media;	 policy	 does	 not	matter	 compared	 to	 its	 presentation;	 spin	 (and	 spin	
doctors)	rule.”	(Fielding,	2012)	Indeed,	Fielding	(ibid.)	castigates	the	series	for	its	comic	success:	
“The	 picture	 painted	 is,	 then,	 hopeless:	 articulating	 popular	 prejudices	 about	 politics,	
which	it	exaggerates	for	comic	effect,	the	series	leaves	viewers	with	no	consolation	other	
than	 their	own	 laughter.	Unlike	 satire	as	 it	 should	be,	 the	series	mocks	with	no	purpose	
other	than	mockery.”	
By	engaging	in	a	satirical	critique	of	soundbite	culture,	personality	and	gesture	politics,	there	is	a	
risk	 that	 satire	will	 confirm	what	 ‘we	 already	 know’.	 This	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 political	 dilemma	 of	
comedy:	a	tranquilising	effect	can	emerge,	whereby	things	may	be	terrible,	but	 ‘hey	at	 least	we	
can	laugh’.	It’s	especially	interesting	to	note	that	Armando	Iannucci	(2016)	recently	responded	to	
requests	 to	bring	back	The	Thick	of	 It	 for	 the	post-Brexit	malaise	with	a	swift	 ‘no’:	 “Rather	 than	
joke	 about	 it,	 I’d	 sooner	 urge	 people	 to	 change	 it.”	The	 general	 implication	 appears	 to	 be	 that	
satire	is	failing.	Whatever	high	ideals	we	might	once	have	associated	with	it,	something	about	its	
take	on	politics	is	either	disarming,	or	worse,	capable	of	shoring	up	the	very	structures	of	power	
it/we	would	seek	to	critique.		
Satire	as	critique	
The	mainstream	critique	of	satire	is	clearly	effective.	It	connects	with	a	popular	view	of	comedy	in	
the	public	sphere	and	licenses	some	important	methodological	implications.	Understanding	how	
comedy	 conforms	 to	 a	 particular	 set	 of	 political	 prejudices	 or	 allows	 for	 their	 contest,	 is	 an	
important	and	growing	 field	 in	 the	politics	of	 comedy.	Audience	 reception	 studies	 that	 capture	
insights	 on	 how	 politicians	 are	 viewed,	 how	 issues	 are	 debated	 (or	 not)	 through	 satirical	
interventions,	and	whether	politicians	are	actively	courting	satirists	through	appearances	on	Have	
I	 Got	 News	 For	 You	 and	 the	Daily	 Show	 represent	 an	 important	 extension	 of	 the	 mainstream	
approach	(Higgie,	2017;	See	also	Morris,	2009).iv	However,	while	sympathetic	to	such	trends,	we	
will	explore	a	more	performative	approach	to	satire	that	is	nevertheless	critical	of	the	potential	for	
instrumentalism	in	the	mainstream	view.		
Firstly,	we	would	argue	that	the	mainstream	critique	of	comedy	produces	a	limited	idea	of	
what	political	satire	is,	or	could	be.	It	harkens	back	to	a	Swiftian	myth	of	satire	as	a	corrective	to	
the	 abuse	 of	 power,	 a	 mechanism	 for	 holding	 the	 excesses	 of	 the	 state	 to	 account.	 A	 quite	
traditional	 lament	 then	 follows,	 that	 things	are	 ‘getting	worse’,	 that	 comedy	 is	 ‘destructive’,	 or	
that	 ‘unlike	satire	as	 it	should	be’	we	are	 left	with	a	 form	of	entertainment	that	 ‘mocks	with	no	
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purpose	other	 than	mockery.’	At	one	 level,	 this	 is	an	 important	 recognition	that	British	satirists	
are	closely	judged	for	their	role	in	politics.	Similar	laments	were	heard	after	the	satire	boom	of	the	
60’s	faded,	and	when	big	names	like	John	Cleese	were	accused	of	‘selling	out’	the	promise	of	their	
comedy	to	popular	entertainment	and	advertising	(Wagg,	2002).	At	another	level	though,	for	all	
the	 stated	desire	 for	 a	 ‘renewal’	of	politics,	 there	 is	 a	 curious	 conservatism	 in	 the	 idea	 that	 the	
restoration	and	cohesion	of	the	liberal	state	form	should	be	the	‘main	aim’	of	satire.	If	we	accept	
the	 critique,	 it	 leads	 down	 a	 path	 of	 using	 satire	 to	 involve	 more	 people	 in	 an	 ‘engaged’	 and	
‘healthy	 skepticism’	 in	 order	 to	 restore	 public	 faith	 in	 ‘good	politicians’.	 But	we	would	 strongly	
question	the	attractiveness	of	 this	view.	Renewing	the	state	 form	of	 liberal	politics	may	be	one	
potential	outcome	of	satirical	 intervention,	but	 it	 is	problematic	to	regard	 it	as	the	primary	aim.	
Why	would	we	celebrate	it	ahead	of	other	concerns	like	ethical	critique,	political	reflexivity,	or	the	
promotion	of	more	radical	forms	of	democracy,	for	instance?		
Thus	secondly,	building	from	this	point,	the	ontology	of	politics	at	work	in	the	mainstream	
critique	of	 satire	 is	both	 limited	and	 limiting.	Politics	 is	 (apparently)	 something	 that	happens	 in	
parliaments,	 political	 parties,	 and	 elections.	All	 that	 a	 public	 sphere	 need	be	 concerned	with	 is	
filling	this	politics	out	with	engaged,	participatory,	deliberation	by	enthusiastic	trusting	citizens.	
On	this	view,	comedy	 is	set	up	quite	 instrumentally	as	either	complementary	 to	the	mainstream	
view	of	the	political	horizon,	or	not.	It	neither	takes	a	full	account	of	the	content,	and	arguments	
of	the	satire	in	question	–	many	of	which	overlap	with	the	concerns	of	political	scientists,	e.g.	on	
soundbite	 culture,	 personality	 politics,	 etc.	 -	 nor	 does	 it	 conceive	 of	 the	 audience	 as	 anything	
other	 than	 a	 (more-or-less)	 passive	 receiver.	 This	 separation	 between	 cultural	 producers	 and	
audience	 consumers	 belies	 a	 further	 set	 of	 assumptions	 about	 how	 satire	 circulates	 that	must	
surely	 be	 questioned.	 At	 a	 time	 when	 ordinary	 people	 are	 increasingly	 producing	 social	media	
content	themselves,	building	networks	of	engagement	outside	of	traditional	institutions,	often	in	
the	language	of	satire	-	e.g.	satirical	critiques	of	UKIP	or	Momentum	on	Twitter	(Higgie,	2015)	–	it	
is	not	clear	why	such	an	instrumental	view	of	input	and	output	should	be	privileged.		
	 Drawing	these	points	together,	there	is	a	performative	limit,	or	a	sense	of	closure,	at	the	
heart	 of	 the	mainstream	 critique	 of	 satire,	which	 is	 that	 it	 reads	 comedy	 according	 to	 a	 state-
centric	vision	of	politics	that	may	not	be	shared.	What	 is	taken	as	cynicism	by	some,	because	 it	
fails	to	support	the	workings	of	parliamentary	democracy,	might	otherwise	be	seen	as	merely	a	
different	 form	 of	 critique.	 Thus,	 we	 detect	 a	 quiet-ism	 about	 alternative	 visions	 of	 politics:	
everyday,	 non-state-centric,	 and/or	 radical.	 Even	 on	 its	 own	 terms	 of	 fostering	 political	
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engagement,	 it	 downplays	 the	 political	 relevance	 of	 the	 capacity	 for	 audiences	 (i.e.	 ordinary	
people)	 to	 tell	 their	 own	 jokes.	 Instead,	we	 seek	 to	 develop	 a	 non-instrumental	 view	 of	 satire,	
which	de-links	 from	the	 requirement	 to	correct	state	 level	politics,	 in	order	 to	entertain	a	more	
everyday	 notion	 of	 satire	 ‘as’	 politics.	 Less	 an	 input-output	 view	 of	 satire,	 and	 more	 a	
performative	approach,	where	different	audiences	are	intimately	involved	and	where	the	effects	
are	unstable	(Butler,	2010).	Culture,	on	this	view,	 is	more	than	the	summation	of	producers	and	
audiences;	it	becomes	a	conversation	that	is	ongoing	and	(at	its	best)	imaginative,	poetic	(Rorty,	
1989).	As	Simon	Critchley	remarks,	‘the	genius	of	jokes	is	that	they	light	up	the	common	features	
of	our	world,	not	by	offering	theoretical	considerations	or	by	writing	two	admirably	fat	volumes	of	
Habermas’s	The	Theory	of	Communicative	Action,	but	in	a	more	practical	way.	They	are	forms	of	
practical	abstraction,	socially	embedded	philosophizing.’	(2002:87)	
Comedy	and	satire	are	therefore	understood	as	political	practices	in	their	own	right,	a	move	
that	 might	 lead	 us	 to	 ask	 different	 questions:	 what	 does	 satire	 do?	 What	 meanings	 are	
encapsulated	 in	 its	critiques?	How	should	we	conceive	of	the	possibilities	and	limits	entailed?	 In	
this	way,	satire	is	rendered	as	an	everyday	vernacular	of	politics	that	can	animate	elements	of	our	
collective	political	contingency:	an	open	record	of	political	life	(Brassett,	2015).			
2. Satire	as	Politics	
While	 there	 is	 much	 to	 be	 gained	 from	 a	 view	 of	 satire	 as	 a	 critical	 foil	 for	 the	 problems	 of	
parliamentary	democracy,	we	think	that	such	a	view	can	downplay	the	role	of	comedy	as	a	space	
of	critical	reflection	in	its	own	right.	As	Louiza	Odysseos	(2001:730-731)	notes,	comedy	need	not	
be	 seen	 as	 just	 political	 -	 it	 can	 much	 more	 profound	 than	 that	 -	 supplementing	 rational	
deliberation	through	its	mere	absurdity:	“making	use	of	the	full	spectrum	of	the	human	register	in	
political	and	moral	considerations”.	Rather	 than	enlist	contemporary	satire	 to	a	pre-established	
model	of	political	interaction,	then,	we	would	rather	license	it	as	a	form	of	political	reflection	and	
critique	per	 se.	 Less	 of	 an	 identifiable	 force	 that	 ‘does	 something’	 ‘to’	 ‘politics’,	 and	more	 as	 a	
language;	 an	 everyday	 vernacular	 of	 political	 life.	On	 these	 terms,	 this	 section	will	 engage	 the	
work	of	three	contemporary	satirists:	Chris	Morris,	Armando	Iannucci,	and	Charlie	Brooker.		
If	political	satire	is	commonly	judged	in	terms	of	an	ability	to	hold	politics	and	politicians	to	
account,	 then	Morris,	 Iannucci	and	Brooker	are	complex	 to	discern.	 In	different	ways	 they	each	
carry	harder	edges,	seem	less	concerned	with	consequences.	Their	comedy	engages	in	a	form	of	
meta-critique	where	the	very	notion	of	 ‘holding	to	account’	 is	 itself	placed	 in	question.	Here	we	
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find	 emblematic	 Chris	 Morris’s	 Day	 Today,	 which	 famously	 saw	 its	 newscaster	 engineer	 a	
declaration	of	war	 from	a	 successful	 trade	negotiation,	 triumphantly	declaring:	 ‘Its	WAR!!’	 as	 a	
panoply	of	hyperbolic	military	reporting	poured	across	the	studio.	For	such	satirists	the	 locus	of	
democracy	 is	 somehow	 obscured	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 24hr	 media:	 soundbite	 culture,	 the	 cult	 of	
personality,	 and	 gesture	 politics.	 Comic	 high	 points	 such	 as	 the	 Brass	 Eye	 special	 on	
‘Paedogeddon’,	or	the	monstrosity	of	characters	like	Malcolm	Tucker,	speak	to	a	general	disquiet	
over	how	we	come	to	 ‘know’	politics.	 Indeed,	as	heir	apparent	to	this	 tradition,	Charlie	Brooker	
has	taken	to	filling	out	his	various	‘wipes’	at	 ‘what	the	bloody	hell’s	going	on?’	with	documentary	
reflections	by	Adam	Curtis	on	the	engineered	confusion	of	global	events.		
While	it	would	be	easy	to	draw	a	line	through	the	work	of	these	comedians,	not	least	since	
they	 have	 all	 collaborated,	 and	 all	 engage	 in	 a	 sophisticated	 critique	 of	 the	 mediatisation	 of	
politics,	we	will	argue	that	it	is	important	to	disaggregate.	In	the	work	of	Chris	Morris,	we	discern	
an	important	point	about	form:	how	language,	sound,	tone,	and	often	violence,	pushes	political	
discourse	in	highly	limited	directions	(e.g.	celebrity	endorsement,	moral	panic,	etc.).	These	trends	
are	picked	up	and	modified	in	the	work	of	Armando	Iannucci	to	present	a	tragedy	of	the	modern	
politician.	Quite	 apart	 from	 the	 cynical	 take,	we	 suggest	 that	 a	 close	 reading	of	The	Thick	 of	 It	
reveals	a	mood	of	tragedy	brought	out	by	trying,	 feeling,	ridiculous,	 failing	comic	figures	(up	to	
and	including	Malcolm	Tucker).	In	this	way,	Iannucci	is	arguably	the	satirist	who	shares	most	with	
the	mainstream	critique	of	satire:	lamenting	the	death	of	a	particular	form	of	politics	where	truth	
and	rational	argument	mattered.	Finally,	we	draw	on	elements	of	the	work	of	Charlie	Brooker	to	
suggest	 that	 the	mood	of	 satire	may	be	 shifting	 from	a	 focus	on	parliamentary	politics,	 to	 the	
politics	of	representation	in	media	relay.	Quite	apart	from	any	disarming	view	this	might	suggest,	
we	 will	 argue	 that	 Brooker	 can	 encourage	 reflection	 on	 the	 subject	 of	 media	 politics	 and	 the	
different	modes	of	inclusion	and	exclusion	this	permits.						
	
Chris	Morris	
Chris	 Morris	 is	 commonly	 understood	 as	 one	 of	 the	 true	 artists	 of	 modern	 satire.	 His	
uncompromising	style,	refusal	to	take	part	 in	the	celebrity	spectacle,	and	the	tendency	of	other	
comedians	 to	use	and/or	defer	 to	his	work	mean	he	has	an	 important	place	 in	 comedy	history.	
Often	 seen	 as	 prescient	 in	 his	 satire,	 a	 common	 refrain	 is	 to	 refer	 to	 any	 element	 of	 current	
politics	or	24hr	news	media	as	an	unknowing	reference	to	Chris	Morris.	His	satire	developed	by	
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targeting	the	media	form	of	politics.	 In	early	radio	shows	this	 involved	taking	soundbites	out	of	
context,	 or	 using	 sounds	 to	 identify	 the	meaning	 of	 sections,	 e.g.	whale	 sounds	 for	 the	 ‘green	
news	desk’.	But	it	gradually	developed	via	the	Day	Today,	to	point	to	an	important	political	limit	in	
the	news	cycle:	a	need	for	sensation	that	diminishes	the	significance	of	policy	and	may	actually	
set	the	agenda.	In	one	sequence,	coverage	of	the	IRA’s	latest	theoretical	strategy	of	turning	dogs	
into	 bombs,	 leads	 police	 to	 cordon	 off	 areas	 of	 London	 and	 conduct	 controlled	 explosions	 on	
(what	 the	 headline	 refers	 to	 as)	 ‘Bomb-Dogs’	 (later	 changed	 to	 ‘Terrier-ists’).	 The	 menace	 of	
exploding	 dogs	 is	 then	 juxtaposed	with	 an	 interview	with	 the	 head	 of	 Sinn	 Fein	who	 is	 legally	
required	 to	 inhale	helium	when	being	 interviewed	“to	subtract	credibility	 from	his	 statements”.	
This	combination	of	moral	panic	with	(ridiculous)	personality	politics	underpinned	Morris’	practice	
of	 interacting	 satirically	with	 the	world	 that	 came	 to	prominence	 in	Brass	Eye.	Brass	Eye	was	a	
thematically	organised	news	parody	show	that	took	a	particular	issue	each	episode	and	explored	
the	 problems	 and	 anxieties	 associated	 with	 the	 media’s	 handling	 of	 that	 issue.	 In	 particular,	
‘Drugs’	and	‘Paedogeddon’	provide	a	fascinating	critique	of	contemporary	political	life	as	well	as	
an	innovative	consideration	of	how	important	political	concepts	are	socially	digested.		
In	performative	 terms,	 the	 interesting	point	about	Chris	Morris	 is	 the	way	that	his	satire	
interacts	with	society,	and	then	subsequently	how	mainstream	politics	attempts	to	take	account	
and	 reconcile	 itself.	 Picking	 up	 where	 ‘Bomb	 Dogs’	 left	 off,	 Brass	 Eye	 followed	 a	 method	 of	
ridiculing	celebrated	figures	 from	the	media,	politics,	sport,	culture	as	well	as	other	well-known	
personalities	to	show	both	the	vacuity	of	celebrity,	but	also	to	 juxtapose	 it	with	the	weight	and	
significance	of	these	issues.	The	episode	‘Drugs’	features	a	number	of	celebrities,	including	Noel	
Edmonds,	 Bernard	Manning,	 Rolf	 Harris,	 as	 well	 as	 the	MP	 David	 Amess,	 who	 were	 asked	 to	
condemn	and	campaign	against	a	drug	called	‘Cake’,	a	new	legal	high	from	Czechoslovakia.v	Cake	
is	represented	by	a	large	luminous	tablet	and	the	celebrities	are	told	the	tablet	is	‘actual	size’,	and	
are	 then	 asked	 to	 read	 out	 some	 fictitious	 scientific	 data	 about	 the	 drug.	Most	 famously,	 the	
campaign	 is	organised	by	the	 ‘Free	the	UK	from	Drugs’	and	 ‘British	Opposition	to	Metabolically	
Bisturbile	Drugs’,	or	‘F.U.K.D’	and	B.O.M.B.D’	for	short.	In	each	interview,	the	celebrities	are	told	
of	 the	 ludicrous	 effects	 of	 ‘cake’	 –	 including	 ‘Czech	 neck’	which	 inflates	 the	 neck	 so	 far	 that	 it	
engulfs	 the	 face	 causing	 asphyxiation,	 or	 Bernard	Manning’s	 lament	 that	 “one	 young	 kiddy	 on	
cake	cried	all	 the	water	out	of	his	body”	 -	as	well	as	being	asked	to	 repeat	 regularly:	 “Cake	 is	a	
made	up	drug”.	However,	nobody	notices	the	joke	and	all	are	keen	to	stop	the	spread	of	drug	use	
in	the	UK.	MP	David	Amess’	appearance	on	the	show	even	led	him	to	raise	the	existence	of	‘cake’	
in	the	House	of	Commons:	
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Mr.	Amess:	To	ask	the	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Home	Department	what	action	the	
Government	propose	in	respect	of	the	import	of	(a)	khat,	(b)	gammahydroxybutyrate	
and	(c)	"cake"	to	the	United	Kingdom.	
Mr.	 Sackville:	 Neither	 the	 khat	 plant	 nor	 the	 substances	 gammahydroxybutyrate--
GHB--or	 "cake",	 which	 we	 understand	 refers	 to	 3,4-methylenedioxy-N-
benzylamphetamine,	 are	 controlled	 under	 the	 international	 United	 Nations	 drug	
conventions	or	under	the	Misuse	of	Drugs	Act	1971	(HC	Deb	23	July	1996,	col	167)	
By	interacting	satirically	with	the	world,	the	program	highlights	how	easily	the	norm	of	celebrity	
campaigns	oriented	around	moral	panic	can	become	empty.	The	 interaction	with	politics	 is	 the	
very	basis	through	which	it	proves	its	value	as	a	form	of	political	engagement	and	contestation.	
Not	 only	 does	 the	 episode	 ‘Drugs’	 directly	 engage	 with	 parliamentary	 democracy,	 but	 it	 also	
shows	how	limited	this	form	of	politics	can	be.	Ironically,	the	same	point	was	made	in	reverse	as	a	
result	 of	 the	Brass	 Eye	 special	 ‘Paedogeddon’,	which	 focused	on	 public	 and	media	 attitudes	 to	
paedophilia.	 The	 controversy	 surrounding	 this	 episode	 led	 to	 a	 number	 of	 politicians	 openly	
condemning	 the	 show	 in	 the	 strongest	 possible	 terms.	 Beverly	 Hughes,	 Minister	 for	 Child	
Protection,	 and	 David	 Blunkett,	 Home	 Secretary,	 both	 went	 on	 record	 to	 decry	 the	 episode,	
although	both	admitted	that	they	had	not	actually	watched	it.		
Although	a	special	episode,	Paedogeddon	followed	a	similar	format	to	‘Drugs’.	Numerous	
celebrities	 were	 drafted	 in	 to	make	 a	 series	 of	 absurd,	 yet	 emotionally	 charged,	 claims	 about	
paedophilia.	 The	 episode	 featured	 a	 number	 of	 celebrities	 making	 ridiculous	 statements	 with	
absolute	 sincerity,	 from	Phil	Collins	declaring	 that	he	was	 “talking	nonce	 sense”	 (nonsense),	 to	
Barbara	Follet	MP	talking	about	‘Pantou	the	Dog’	a	child’s	game	on	the	internet	where	“an	online	
paedophile	has	converted	[the	dogs	eye]	to	be	a	webcam	to	 look	at	the	children	playing”.	Such	
games	are	part	of	a	Hidden	Online	Entrapment	Control	System,	which	is	reduced	to	the	acronym	
HOECS,	said	phonetically	‘hoax’.	Richard	Blackwood	states	that	such	“HOECS	games	make	your	
children	 smell	 like	 hammers”	 and	 that	 “online	 paedophiles	 can	 actually	 make	 your	 keyboard	
release	 toxic	 vapours	 that	 actually	make	 you	more	 suggestible."	After	 sniffing	 his	 keyboard	he	
says,	“Now	I	actually	feel	more	suggestible.	And	that	was	just	from	one	sniff”.		
Again,	we	might	be	 tempted	 to	 channel	 the	mainstream	view	of	 satire	here:	 Lockyer	&	
Attwood	(2009:57)	make	the	point	that	Brass	Eye	does	not	offer	any	solutions,	thus	limiting	how	
“informative	or	critical	its	satirical	attack	can	be”.	However,	we	would	argue	that	the	absurdity	of	
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Brass	Eye	not	only	satirises	the	limited	nature	of	British	political	discourse,	but	it	also	deliberately	
performs	it.	In	doing	so	Chris	Morris	clearly	enters	into	an	area	of	uncertainty	(Meike	2012:25).	As	
he	has	previously	noted:	 “You	have	 to	be	 at	 best	 only	half	 aware	of	what	 you’re	 trying…if	 you	
know	what	you’re	looking	for	there’s	no	attempt	to	do	some	real	work”	(Hanks	2013).	On	the	issue	
of	paedophilia,	the	Brass	Eye	episode	(including	the	media	reaction	to	the	performance)	embodied	
the	difficulty	that	British	society	has	with	paedophilia,	not	in	spite	of,	but	because	of	media	and	
political	interest	in	the	matter.			
	
Armando	Iannucci		
If	Chris	Morris	asks	a	set	of	interesting	performative	questions	about	the	satirical	status	of	politics,	
challenging	us	 to	 think	 through	 the	entwinement	 and	mutually	 subversive	behaviour	of	 satirist	
and	politician,	then	Iannucci	develops	an	altogether	more	traditional	satirical	method	in	order	to	
ask:	what	happens	when	we	make	this	absurd	situation	a	background	to	politics	and	policy?	While	
Morris	 is	more	comfortable	 to	 let	politicians	make	 fools	of	 themselves,	 Iannucci	has	 repeatedly	
emphasised	 the	 tragic	 consequences	 of	 how	 media	 relay	 and	 political	 process	 are	 becoming	
entwined.	In	a	long	career	of	production,	script	writing	and	acting,	he	has	been	behind	some	the	
most	 important	and	 successful	 series	 in	TV	comedy.	His	acute	 sensitivity	 to	 the	 comic	value	of	
flawed	characters	who	respond	to	difficult	circumstances,	an	eye	for	the	absurdity	of	mediatised	
society,	 and	 a	 love	 of	 mundane	 life	 (e.g.	 Alan	 Partridge’s	 frequent	 trips	 to	 the	 24hr	 garage,	
Malcolm	Tucker’s	penchant	for	‘old	style’	Curlywurlys,	or	Peter	Mannion’s	love	of	a	relaxing	Twix)	
mark	 him	out	 as	 a	 satirist	who	 takes	 the	 everyday	 as	 a	 productive	 resource.	 In,	The	 Thick	 of	 It	
Hugh	Abbott	struggles	to	keep	up	on	a	very	human	level:	
	“I	work,	I	eat,	I	shower.	That's	it.	Occasionally,	I	take	a	dump,	just	as	a	sort	of	treat.	I	mean,	
that	really	is	my	treat.	That's	what	it's	come	to.	I	sit	there	and	I	think,	‘No,	I'm	not	going	to	
read	The	New	Statesman.	This	time	is	just	for	me.	This	is	quality	time	just	for	me.’	Is	that	
normal?”vi		
The	politicians	 sit,	 nominally,	 at	 the	 top	of	 a	 cast	of	 unelected	 special	 advisors	 and	 civil	
servants.	Although	as	becomes	clear	they	live	and	work	in	constant	fear	of	the	media	cycle	as	it	is	
embodied	in	such	‘fixers’	and	‘spin	artists’.	Far	from	being	greedy	or	‘bastards’,	the	few	politicians	
presented	in	the	show	are	portrayed	as	amateurish,	vain,	 inexperienced	and,	ultimately,	foolish.	
As	 Amoore	 &	 Hall	 (2013:99)	 note,	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 fool	 derives	 from	 its	 historical	
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association	 with	 chaos	 and	 misrule,	 thus	 creating	 ‘an	 inverted	 and	 upturned	 world’.	 The	
presentation	of	the	politician	as	a	fool	in	the	Thick	of	It	turns	the	traditional	understanding	–	and	
the	 ideological	 basis	 –	 of	 British	 liberal	 democracy	 on	 its	 head:	 that	 our	 politicians	 have	
meaningful	 agency	and	 control.	 In	The	Thick	Of	 It,	 none	of	 these	 things	are	 true.	 For	 example,	
Peter	Mannion	struggles	to	understand	the	very	concept	of	an	app	when	trying	and	failing	to	sell	
his	coalition	partner’s	vision	of	a	‘silicon	playground’.vii	It	is	a	policy	he	does	not	understand,	does	
not	want	to	promote,	and	one	he	even	destroys	against	his	will.		
	 Beyond	this	diminution	of	political	agency	by	the	structure	of	mediatised	politics,	the	idea	
of	 the	 fool	 goes	 further.	Another	 key	 aspect	 of	 the	 fool,	 in	 traditional	 terms,	 is	 the	 character’s	
ability	to	see	beyond	the	immediate	surface	of	what	occurs	in	society	(ibid.).	In	essence,	they	offer	
a	 critical	 insight	 into	 the	 world	 but,	 as	 fools,	 they	 are	 dismissed	 as	 frivolous	 and	 so	 occupy	 a	
peripheral	 role	 in	the	story	 (Critchley	2002:	82).	The	Thick	Of	 It	 inverts	this	 formula:	 rather	than	
playing	a	peripheral	character,	the	fool	is	now	the	central	figure	of	the	story,	or	rather	the	tragedy	
is	 the	 gradual	 realisation	 that	 we	 are	 ‘all	 fools’.	 For	 example,	 Glenn	 Cullen,	 the	 principled	
peripheral	 character,	 whose	 arc	 portrays	 the	 death	 of	 meaningful	 politics:	 the	 only	 character	
capable	 of	 genuine	 empathy	 for	 colleagues	 and	 even	 Mr	 Tickelviii,	 whose	 (foolish)	 nervous	
breakdown	illustrates	much	that	is	wrong	in	the	party:				
Glenn:	Fucking	hell!	Fuck!	Jesus,	I'm	not	a	joke,	okay,	all	right,	hello?	I	am	a	man.	I	am	
a	 man,	 you	 know,	 you	 know?!	 This,	 THIS!!!!	 THIS	 IS	 MY	 LIFE!!!!	 I'M	 A	 HUMAN	
BEING,	 AND	 ALL	 THIS	 IS	 MY	 LIFE!!	 And,	 it's	 collapsing	 in	 front	 of	 me.	 […]	 I'm	
irrelevant,	I'm	irrelevant,	I'm	irrelevant!		
Gradually,	however,	the	fools	become	aware	of	their	tragic	predicament	and	rage	turns	to	a	form	
of	pathetic	acceptance.	 In	policy	 terms,	government	 is	 constrained,	not	principally	by	action	or	
deed,	 but	 by	 public	 perception,	 and	 how	 public	 perception	 itself	 is	 constituted.	 But	 this	
recognition	can	bring	no	comfort,	even	for	the	apparent	spin	masters	like	Malcolm	Tucker.	From	
pre-emptive	leaking	that	turns	out	to	not	be	required,	to	managing	the	perception	of	equality	by	
placing	 Nicola	 Murray’s	 child	 in	 a	 state	 school	 where	 she	 goes	 off	 the	 rails	 and	 becomes	 a	
potential	 nightmare	 headline	 for	 the	 government,	 his	 intensity	 often	 backfires.	 The	 focus	 on	
spinners,	then,	is	not	necessarily	a	form	of	cynicism,	but	rather	an	observation	about	how	political	
thought	and	practise	is	conditioned	by	context;	and	how	the	politics	of	that	context	has	become	a	
self-perpetuating	 edifice.	 Even	 Malcolm	 Tucker,	 that	 most	 Machiavellian	 and	 demonstrably	
powerful	figure	succumbs	to	a	tragic	realisation	of	this	context.	At	one	point,	unable	to	text	Terri,	
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Malcolm	 shouts	 at	 her	 and,	 in	 front	 of	 the	 office,	 she	 tells	 him	 he	 is	 losing	 it	 and	 he	 should	
apologise.ix	He	 leads	her	 into	a	private	room	for	what	many	expect	to	be	a	typically	apocalyptic	
sacking,	but	instead,	his	breakdown	continues,	and	he	actually	opens	up	about	the	pressure	he	is	
feeling.	When	Terri	comforts	him	and	apologies	he	assures	her:		
“No,	I'm	over	it,	okay?	Don't	you	apologise.	Don't	you	fucking	apologise.	You	don't	need	to	
apologise.	 I	 love	 this	 place.	 I	 do.	 I	mean,	 fucking,	 compared	 to	Number	 10,	 this	 place	 is	
fucking	 tranquil,	 yeah?	Over	 there,	 300	 yards	 down	 the	 road,	 I	mean,	 it's	 like	 a	 fucking	
cancer	ward.	 I	mean,	there	are	people	 in	there,	 they're	 fucking	screaming	at	each	other.	
They	 are	 screaming,	 ‘You	 gave	 me	 this	 fucking	 disease.’	 ‘You	 gave	 me	 this	 fucking	
disease.’	And	every	corner	that	 I	 turn	there's	another	threat,	Terri.	Hacks,	hacks,	 fucking	
vampire	hacks.	And	 they're	 slaughtering	us,	 Terri.	 They	 are	 fucking	 slaughtering	us	 and	
they	want	my	 face	 for	a	 flannel!	And	you	know	what?	 I	used	 to	be	 the	 fucking	pharaoh,	
Terri.	 I	used	to	be	 the	 fucking	pharaoh.	Now	 I'm	fucking	 floundering	 in	a	 fucking	Nile	of	
shit.	But	I	am	going	to	fashion	a	paddle	out	of	that	shit.	Yeah?”	
While	 tempting	 to	dismiss	 the	 fatalistic	 and	 cynical	 dimensions	of	 the	The	Thick	 of	 It	 (Fielding,	
2014a:262),	 we	 prefer	 to	 emphasise	 this	 theme	 of	 tragedy	 as	 a	 critical	 device.	 For	 example,	
Fielding	 (ibid:	 260)	 describes	 the	 programme	 as	 ‘denigrating	 popular	 agency’	 through	 its	
depiction	 of	 the	 public	 as	 disinterested	 and	 comically	 aggressive	 towards	 politicians.	 But	 this	
separation,	between	the	general	public	and	politicians	is,	in	part,	a	product	of	a	limited	model	of	
politics	that	should	be	placed	in	question.	Where	Fielding	(ibid:	263)	sees	proof	of	hopelessness,	
that	‘awful	politics	goes	on,	and	on,	and	on’,	we	read	a	sharp	critique	of	politics	as	usual	–	where	
separations	between	politicians	and	public	are	entrenched	as	part	of	the	operating	mechanism	of	
politics	via	media	strategies	to	‘better	communicate’	(e.g.	with	‘quiet	bat	people’).	Considered	in	
this	light,	British	politics	as	a	whole	–	and	the	society	of	which	it	is	essentially	a	part	–	is	revealed	
as	deeply	problematic.	By	representing	contemporary	British	politics	as	an	ongoing	tragedy,	The	
Thick	Of	It	provides	an	alternative	framework	through	which	to	think	about	politics:	a	critical	lens	
through	which	the	distinction	between	politics	and	everyday	life	is	revealed	as	fantastical.	
	
Charlie	Brooker	
Where	 Chris	Morris	 highlights	 the	mediatised	 limits	 of	 political	 life	 in	 the	UK,	 Iannucci’s	 satire	
presents	 a	 more	 human	 centred	 tragedy	 about	 the	 everyday	 life	 of	 people	 at	 the	 centre	 of	
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politics.	 Rather	 than	 standing	 outside	 and	 poking	 fun	 at	 politicians	 (and	 celebrities)	 as	 they	
stumble	from	one	moral	panic	to	the	next,	the	satire	rather	 inhabits	the	logics	of	this	emergent	
context,	seeking	to	think	through	and	understand	how	they	work	to	perform	political	possibility.	
For	Morris	the	emptiness	is	absurd	when	compared	to	the	societal	weight	of	the	issues	involved,	
for	Iannucci	this	backdrop	must	be	seen	as	an	unfolding	tragedy	on	a	human	scale.		
Such	 themes	 are	 seemingly	 rehearsed	 in	 altogether	 lighter,	 more	 playful,	 tones	 in	 the	
satire	of	Charlie	Brooker.	Working	across	 a	 similar	 time	period,	 although	arguably	peeking	 just	
after	The	Thick	of	It,	Brooker	has	developed	a	style	of	satire	that	blends	tightly	edited	sequences,	
spliced	 and	 narrated	with	 his	 own	 sardonic	 and	 fatal	 voice.	His	 style	might	 be	 typified	 as	 high	
snark,	 or	 educated-lad	 humour,	 since,	 despite	 his	 eye	 for	 a	 sophisticated	 argument,	 he	 is	
nevertheless	happy	to	play	around	with	smutty	puns	and	puerile	humour.	While	echoing	elements	
of	 the	Morris	and	 Iannucci,	Brooker	must	be	seen	as	an	 important	departure	 for	his	decision	 to	
give	up	on	a	fictional	backdrop	altogether.	For	Brooker,	the	media	already	functions	as	an	absurd	
comically	theatrical	form,	per	se:		
‘Politicians	and	newsmakers	know	this,	which	is	why	everything	is	geared	more	and	more	
towards	 soundbites	 and	 razzle-dazzle.	 The	 soap	 opera	 analogy	 is	 a	 fitting	 one	 because	
that’s	 what	 the	 news	 has	 become	 […]	 Sometimes	 it’s	 happy,	 sometimes	 it’s	 sad,	 but	
somehow	it	isn’t	real.’		
Interestingly,	 much	 of	 Brooker’s	 output	 is	 addressed	 to	 the	 audience	 of	 media:	 the	 individual	
subject,	who	watches	 the	news	and	 seeks	 to	 comprehend	global	 events.	So,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	
presenter	 and	 the	 first	 person	 narrator,	 Brooker	 also	 appears	 as	 a	 television	 viewer,	 sat	 in	 his	
living	room	on	a	comfortable	sofa.	This	attempt	to	define	and	personalise	the	audience	suggests	
a	degree	of	identification	–	breaking	down	the	illusory	barrier	between	performer	and	audience	–	
and	a	provocation,	asking	us:	do	you	see	it	this	way?	Do	you	challenge	or	question	what	you	are	
told?	 Such	 a	 reflexive	 conception	 of	 the	 audience-subject	 suggests	 an	 unstable	 performance:	
there	is	a	possibility	for	disagreement,	ignorance,	denial,	or	even	involvement.		
More	recently,	Brooker	has	developed	two	additional	viewer	characters	–	Barry	Shitpeas	
and	Philomena	Cunk	–	who	comment	upon	and	engage	 in	the	various	politico-media	narratives	
that	are	emerging.	The	irony	in	these	talking	head	vignettes	is	often	multi-layered	and	difficult	to	
define,	a	fact	that	brings	a	rich,	polyphonic	experience	to	the	satire.	In	one	discussion	of	Benefits	
Street,	a	Channel	4	documentary	about	poor	people	on	state	benefits	who	all	happen	to	live	in	the	
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same	street,	the	performativity	we	identified	in	Chris	Morris’	work,	specifically	 in	relation	to	the	
reception	of	Brass	Eye,	is	actively	courted:		
Barry	 Shitpeas:	 There	was	 this	 sort	 of	 anger	making	 program	 called	Benefits	 Street.	 It	
gave	you	a	fascinating	insight	into	the	lives	of	these	people	who’ve	got	next	to	nothing,	so	
you	can	judge	‘em.	[…]	
Philomena	Cunk:	When	I	was	watching	it	I	felt	sort	of	pity	for	the	people	in	it,	but	when	I	
went	on	Twitter	everyone	was	angry	with	them	so	I	thought,	oh	I’ve	got	it	wrong	I’d	better	
join	in	with	that,	so	then	I	wrote	these	little	tweet	things,	about	how	they	were	scum	and	
bastards	 and	 about	 how	 I	 hope	 the	 government	 fucking	 shoots	 them,	 and	 then	 stands	
over	their	bodies	pumping	bullet	after	bullet	into	their	benefit	scum	bastard	bodies.	And	I	
got	like	20	new	followers	for	that	so	it	was	a	pretty	good	program...	People	say	there’s	no	
community	anymore	but	watching	that	interesting	show	and	joining	in	with	everyone	on	
the	internet	hating	them	together,	sort	of	outdoing	each	other	to	express	how	much	hate	
you	felt,	was	amazing.	I	don’t	think	I’ve	ever	felt	so	much	part	of	a	huge	group	with	all	this	
fun	anger	surging	through	us.	It	really	made	me	feel	alive.x	
By	placing	the	viewer	at	the	centre	of	the	satire,	there	is	a	challenge	to	think	through	how	politics	
works,	where	opinions	 comes	 from,	 and	how	 they	are	disciplined.	Contra	Fielding	 (2014b:262),	
who	 takes	 the	 view	 that	 Brooker,	 notably	 in	 his	 dystopian	 comedy	 series	 Black	 Mirror,	
characterises	 the	 audience	 as	 ‘facile’	 and	 showing	 a	 ‘flippant	 disregard	 for	 serious	 politics’	
[emphasis	 added],	 our	 account	 instead	 offers	 a	 view	 of	 Brooker	 urging	 viewers	 to	 deconstruct	
that	 illusory	division	between	audience	and	media,	as	well	as	that	division	between	politics	and	
everything	else.	On	 this	view,	 it	 can	be	argued	 that	 the	person	who	watches	Charlie	Brooker	 is	
performatively	inscribed	as	both	the	recipient	and	the	instigator	of	the	satire.	Beyond	questions	
of	getting	the	 joke	or	not,	 liking	 it,	or	not,	a	performative	 instability	 is	presented	at	 the	centre:	
how	do	we	come	to	know	politics?	
	 His	2014	Wipe	 of	 the	 year	 included	 the	work	of	 documentary	 filmmaker	Adam	Curtis	 in	
order	to	problematise	the	confusion	that	currently	surrounds	politics.	A	provocation	 in	 line	with	
Brooker’s	 focus	 on	 the	 recipient	 subject,	 Curtis	 picked	 up	 and	 elaborated	 Brooker’s	 traditional	
themes	 of	 confusion	 and	 bewilderment	 at	 the	 ‘chaos	 that	 seems	 to	 be	 engulfing	 everything:’xi	
Across	 a	 combination	 of	 disjointed	 edit	 sequences	 and	 a	 typically	 dystopian	 lo-fi	 soundtrack,	
Curtis	 describes	 an	 “odd	 non-linear	 world	 that	 plays	 into	 the	 hands	 of	 those	 in	 power”	 where	
everything	the	media	tells	us	seems	confusing	and	contradictory.	We	have	the	biggest	financial	
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crisis	in	decades,	yet	not	a	single	banker	goes	to	jail.	Instead	they	get	bailed	out	and	given	millions	
in	 quantitative	 easing:	 ‘But	 it	 gets	 even	 more	 confusing	 because	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 has	
admitted	that	those	millions	of	pounds	have	not	gone	where	they	are	supposed	to.	A	vast	amount	
of	the	money	has	actually	found	its	way	into	the	hands	of	the	wealthiest	five	per	cent	in	Britain.	It	
has	been	described	as	the	biggest	transfer	of	wealth	to	the	rich	in	recent	documented	history.	It	
could	be	a	huge	scandal	comparable	to	the	greedy	oligarchs	in	Russia.	A	ruthless	elite	syphoning	
off	billions	of	pounds	in	public	money.	But	nobody	seems	to	know.	It	sums	up	the	strange	mood	
of	our	time	where	nothing	really	makes	any	coherent	sense.	We	live	with	a	constant	vaudeville	of	
contradictory	stories	which	makes	 it	 impossible	for	any	real	opposition	to	emerge	because	they	
can’t	 counter	 it	 with	 a	 coherent	 narrative	 of	 their	 own.	 And	 it	 means	 that	 we	 as	 individuals	
become	 ever	 more	 powerless	 –	 unable	 to	 challenge	 anything	 because	 we	 live	 in	 a	 state	 of	
confusion	and	uncertainty.	To	which	the	response	is	‘oh	dear’.	But	that’s	what	they	want	you	
to	say.’	
	
	
3. The	Rise	of	Satirical	Literacy	
In	summary,	there	are	lines	to	be	drawn	between	the	work	of	the	three	satirists	considered	in	the	
previous	 section	 and	 the	 mainstream	 critique.	 They	 each	 portray	 politicians	 in	 terms	 which	
undermine	 them,	 question	 the	 agency	 of	 parliamentary	 politics,	 and	 question	 how	 the	 media	
relay	is	diminishing	the	quality	of	discourse	within	the	public	sphere.	However,	against	those	who	
would	see	this	form	of	satire	as	merely	a	cynical	turn,	laughing	at	politicians	without	encouraging	
debate	and	discussion,	we	have	elaborated	a	more	performative	reading.	The	success	of	British	
satire	has	created	a	burgeoning	industry	‘yes’,	but	it	has	also	invested	the	vernacular	of	political	
life	 with	 a	 ready	 set	 of	 critical	 devices.	 Satirical	 performances	 are	 not	 closed	 events,	 they	 are	
received	 and	 re-iterated,	 modified	 and	 subverted.	 As	 such,	 we	 have	 cautioned	 against	 an	
exclusive	focus	on	the	‘political	impact’	of	satire,	in	order	to	explore	the	proliferation	of	satire	as	
an	everyday	 language	of	political	 life.	 In	 this	way	we	very	much	echo	the	argument	of	Stephen	
Wagg	(2002:	324)	that	far	from	dying,	“satire	has	become	deeply	woven	into	public	discourse	and	
has	helped	 to	define	a	new	paradigm	 for	 the	mediation	of	 the	public	 sphere”.	We	 identify	 four	
strands	of	thought	that	could	be	productively	developed	in	future	work.			
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Firstly,	 satire	develops	and	structures	a	 form	of	political	critique	that	bears	 reflection	on	
it’s	own	terms.	The	work	of	Morris,	Iannucci,	and	Brooker	reveals	an	acute	critique	of	mediatised	
politics	 that	 targets	 the	 weakness	 of	 deliberation	 about	 social	 issues	 in	 the	 UK,	 the	 tragic	
potentials	of	this	backdrop	for	political	practice,	and	a	provocative	move	to	consider	the	viewer	as	
a	 site	 of	 political	 agency.	 But	 this	 critique	 interacts	 with	 its	 context,	 it	 exceeds	 its	 initial	
performance,	so	to	speak.	While	elements	of	Morris’	work	make	the	politician	 look	ridiculous,	 it	
should	be	 foregrounded	 that	 the	performative	 interaction	 is	 open	 and	unstable.	We	might,	 for	
instance,	 hate	 a	 show	 like	 ‘Paedogeddon’	 because	 it	 hoodwinks	MPs,	 but	we	might	 also	 learn	
something	 from	 the	 media	 reaction	 –	 which	 placed	 strident	 critiques	 of	 the	 show	 opposite	 a	
spread	of	adolescent	girls	 in	Bikinis	 (Lockyer	and	Attwood,	2009)	–	and	how	MP	hubris	allowed	
them	to	critique	Morris	without	having	seen	the	program	(Guardian	2001a;	2001b).	On	this	view,	
there	is	a	certain	zombie-like	quality	to	the	performative	politics	of	satire.	A	joke	that	might	once	
look	 offensive	 can,	 through	 its	 unstable	 interactions	 with	 society,	 be	 re-iterated	 in	 different	
circumstances;	thus	the	meaning	of	satire	is	in	a	process	of	negotiation,	over	time,	with	different	
audiences,	and	new	performers.		
Secondly,	there	is	a	range	of	political	possibilities	on	offer	across	the	work	of	these	three	
satirists.	Morris	seems	to	license	a	kind	of	‘never	ending	satire’	–	whereby	once	the	joke	is	rolling	
we	are	beholden	to	let	the	consequences	be	what	they	will.	While	uncertain	and	unstable,	this	can	
nevertheless	be	seen	as	an	important	political	technique	in	its	own	right.	Contemporary	satirists	
like	Lee	Nelson	and	Al	Murray	have	continued	to	 interact	satirically	with	the	world,	whether	by	
dropping	cash	on	Sepp	Blatter,	or	standing	for	election	against	Nigel	Farage	as	the	Pub	Landlord.	
The	performativity	of	everyday	satire	can	inspire	forms	of	political	intervention	which	do	different	
things,	critique	and	deliberate	in	alternative	registers.	While	elements	of	this	style	might	appear	
glib	or	spectacular,	 it	does	not	restrict	from	more	politically	engaged	work	such	as	that	pursued	
by,	 say,	Revolting,	which	 arguably	 echoes	 a	 number	 of	 anti-globalisation	 themes	 pioneered	 by	
grass	roots	activist	groups	like	the	Space	Hijackers	and	the	Clown	Army	(Rossdale,	2016).		
Beyond	the	ability	of	comedians	to	learn	from	each	other,	we	would	suggest	that	a	more	
pervasive	set	of	effects	emerge	when	a	show	like	the	Thick	of	It	becomes	so	embedded	in	public	
discourse.	In	providing	such	a	robust	critique	of	politics,	Iannucci	has	created	an	alternative	critical	
register	for	thinking	about	British	political	life.	Through	its	popularity	The	Thick	Of	It	fosters	a	kind	
of	satirical	literacy	about	Spin	Doctors	and	Spads,	about	gesture	politics	and	public	relations.	The	
now	 popular	 refrain	 that	 one	 or	 other	 political	 event	 is	 ‘just	 like	 an	 episode	 of	 The	 Thick	 Of	 It’		
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suggests,	for	us,	a	reflexive	language	of	engagement.	For	example,	Jeremy	Corbyn’s	reference	to	
“ordinary	people	doing	extraordinary	things”	in	his	speech	to	the	Annual	Labour	Party	Conference	
(Corbyn	 2015),	 which	 was	 word-for-word	 what	 Nicola	 Murray	 says	 about	 “Fourth	 Sector	
Pathfinders”,	was	noted	by	 Iannucci	himself	 (Evening	Standard	2015).	Equally,	 the	 rise	of	social	
media	parody	accounts	has	regularly	and	commonly	referenced	the	programme,	e.g.	the	Twitter	
account	Peter	Mannion	MP	parodied	the	early	Brexit	brainstorming	sessions	as	a	version	of	 the	
‘ideas	retreat’	in	Series	3,	with	Mannion	asking	‘Am	I	Norway-Plus’?	Again	these	are	not	issues	of	
political	 impact,	but	do	suggest	a	productive	dimension	to	satirical	performance	where	terms	of	
engagement	are	updated,	generalised	and	–	through	use	–	modified.			
Thirdly,	 and	 developing	 from	 this	 point,	 the	 Brass	 Eye-like	 responses	 to	 Brass	 Eye	 can	
fathom	a	deeper	problematic	of	what	happens	once	satire	is	let	loose	in	the	world.	One	prominent	
example	of	the	‘zombie-like’	nature	of	satire,	is	the	appointment	of	David	Amess	MP	as	Chair	of	
the	Committee	to	discuss	 the	Psychoactive	Substances	Bill	and	the	satirical	 reactions	 this	drew	
(Stone	2015).	In	other	words,	David	Amess	will	now	play	a	major	role	in	determining	the	future	of	
British	drugs	policy.	While	a	small	circle	of	initiates	may	take	this	as	a	very	pure	form	of	comedy,	
whereby	politics	 itself	becomes	a	 form	of	satire,	 it	 is	clear	 that	we	are	 in	unstable	 territory.	For	
instance,	beyond	the	positive	image	of	satirical	literacy,	we	may	also	need	to	consider	the	role	of	
politics	and	media	 in	 the	 recuperation	of	critique.	What	happens,	 for	 instance,	when	politicians	
appear	in	a	satirical	light?	Remarking	upon	the	use	of	his	jokes	by	David	Cameron,	Iannucci	(2016)	
suggested	that	one	reason	not	to	turn	the	joke	back	against	him	is	that	‘politicians	no	longer	act	
like	 real	 versions	of	 themselves.	 Instead,	 they	 come	over	 as	 replicants	 of	 an	 idealised,	 fictional	
version	 of	 what	 they	 think	 a	 politician	 should	 be.	 They	 perform	 politics,	 rather	 than	 practise	
policy.	[…]	We’re	left	watching	an	entertainment	rather	than	participating	in	affairs	of	state.’	On	
these	 terms,	 Stewart	 Lee	 (2014)	 and	Will	 Self	 (2015)	 have	 pursued	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 invented	
character	 of	 Boris	 Johnson	 should	 rather	 be	 understood	 as	 the	 “world’s	 first	 self-satirising	
politician”.xii	This	is	an	issue	that	mainstream	critique	of	satire	would	clearly	place	as	a	failure.	But	
to	underline,	we	would	rather	open	up	such	dilemmas	to	ongoing	questioning.	There	are	multiple	
iterations	 of	 satire	 (some	 of	 it	 by	 politicians)	 with	 different	 critical	 potentials	 interacting	 and	
manifesting	in	an	open	and	dynamic	society.	So	it	may	be	an	unfashionable	point,	but	references	
to	 the	 failure	 of	 satire	 in	 regard	 to	 Boris	 Johnson	 could	 equally	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 successful	
move	by	the	politician,	playing	upon	the	political	potential	that	satirical	literacy	affords.xiii		
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Finally,	 this	everyday	merging	between	satire	and	politics	does	not	seem	to	 turn	people	
off	from	politics,	 indeed,	we	might	argue	that	one	reason	for	the	massive	public	engagement	in	
the	EU	referendum	was	precisely	 the	 irreverent	style	of	 ‘self-satirising’	politicians	 like	Boris	and	
Nigel	 Farage.	 But	 it	 does	 challenge	 us	 to	 find	 new	modes	 of	 intervention.	 In	 this	 vein,	 Charlie	
Brooker	 offers	 the	 most	 direct	 reflection	 on	 the	 question	 of	 what	 and	 where	 politics	 is?	 His	
deconstruction	of	media	narrative,	decentring	of	the	viewer	subject,	and	his	use	of	an	open	ended	
performance,	 arguably	 leaves	 the	 work	 of	 politics	 to	 the	 audience.	 Unlike	 the	 ritual	 of	
parliamentary	 politics,	 satirical	 engagement	 can	 be	 both	 unpredictable	 and	 uncoordinated	 as	
David	Cameron	found	with	the	‘PigGate’	allegation,	which	became	a	social	media	meme	reflexive	
to	the	eerie	parallels	with	Charlie	Brooker’s	Black	Mirror	episode	‘The	National	Anthem’.xiv	Can	the	
rise	of	satirical	literacy	from	the	backdrop	for	such	engagement?	Rebecca	Higgie	(2015)	describes	
a	 form	 of	 ‘citizen	 satire’,	 how	 ordinary	 people	 engage	 critically	 with	 politics	 via	 social	 media	
memes,	as	a	significant	proliferation	of	agency.	While	far	from	romantic	about	the	potentials	of	a	
bottom-up	 form	 of	 public	 sphere	 populated	 by	 citizen	 satirists,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 new	 moral	
economies	of	satire	are	emerging	on	social	media	that	are	quickly	circulated	and	highly	inclusive.	
They	may	be	 rough	around	the	edges,	encourage	a	 form	of	attack	 level	politics,	or	even	 feed	a	
conspiratorial	tone.	But	as	an	everyday	form	of	politics,	the	growth	of	citizen	satire	does	not	so	
much	diminish,	as	change	the	terms	of	political	engagement.		
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i In a comprehensive qualitative study of political television fiction that included comedy and satire 
(Van Zoonen and Wring, 2012) found that while US fiction tended to be optimistic or inspiring in tone, 
British political comedies tended to portray politicians as dim witted or selfish, with a general gloomy 
outlook that suggests ‘there is no use trying’.  
ii It should be noted that while the US literature on satire asks a similar set of questions to the 
mainstream critique, i.e. how does it affect politics?, it tends toward a more positive set of answers. 
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This general divergence can be read into elements of the US literature on satire which has tended to 
celebrate the capacity of major titles like the Daily Show and the Colbert Report to proactively occupy a 
tranche of the news media industry. As Julie Webber (2013: 8) argues, ‘While communications scholars 
have a close affinity to political theory because of their interest in the way changing media have 
transformed informat9ion gathering and sharing in democratic republics, they offer little in the way of 
explaining how certain narrative forms of political comedy organize or disorganize political affiliation, 
and often fail to connect it to historical trends in thinking about the economy, culture wars, modern 
political parties and social movements.’ 
iii https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bcFaizGw860  
iv For an interesting critical discussion of the audience and the politics of audience reception studies, see 
Janelle Reinelt 'What UK Spectators Know: Understanding How We Come to Value Theatre', Theatre 
Journal 66.3 (2014): 337-361. While a study on Theatre we share many of Reinelt’s observations on the 
limitations of an instrumental view of the worth of performance, and while we would not rehearse the 
common debates on intrinsic value, we agree that sociality, engagement, and ongoing discussion would 
be an important methodological adaptation for audience studies to contemplate.   
v  Broadcast on 5th February 1997, this claim was made over four years after the division of 
Czechoslovakia.  
vi Hugh Abbott is the first Minister for Social Affairs in The Thick of It, eventually replaced by Nicola 
Murray. He explains his ‘treat’ to Glenn Cullen, who acts as his dogsbody throughout the first two 
series. Glenn, in response to Hugh’s rhetorical question, answers, ‘It’s sad’. 
vii Peter Mannion, the Tory Minister for Social Affairs and Citizenship in a Coalition Government, 
launches a policy to get students to design apps in classrooms, for which they would not be paid. 
Mannion, completely out of touch with both technology and social change in Britain, embarrasses 
himself and the Government at the launch of the policy. This fictional policy reflected – and in fact, 
preceded – a policy implemented by the actual Coalition Government in 2012. 
viii Douglass Tickel is a nurse, camped outside Parliament in opposition to Government policy. He is 
regularly derided by the members of the Coalition Government and the Opposition. Mr Tickel’s story 
is the driving force and instigation for all the events of the final series of The Thick of It, even leading 
to the final downfall of Malcolm Tucker, who leaked his medical records. Glenn Cullen is the only 
character in the show who shows genuine remorse at Mr Tickel’s death. 
ix Terri Coverley’s role in the Department for Social Affairs and Citizenship is to manage media 
relations. She is the former Head of Press for Waitrose and, ostensibly, the least competent at her job. 
She is not respected at all by her colleagues in the Department. For this reason, it is particularly unusual 
that Malcolm Tucker, of all people, should confide in and sincerely apologise to her. 
x http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KUYEk5nRlFw  
xi https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wcy8uLjRHPM  
xii  Charlie Brooker also considers Nigel Farage such a politician: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/05/06/charlie-brooker-election-wipe-bbc_n_7221262.html  
xiii Again the mainstream approach would posit a set of instrumental rationalities to explain this 
performance. For example, (Wood, Corbett, and Flinders, 2016) re-phrase it as part of a new form of 
statecraft, a move to celebrity status that provides legitimacy for continued political action. While an 
interesting argument, we would suggest that there are important developments beyond self-interested 
statecraft, not the least of which, would be the way Boris Johnson has used satire to defend the human 
rights of Turkish artists. This was a heartfelt move that became widely derided in media and policy 
circles, even as it explored fundamental issues of human rights and political agency.     
xiv https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sf3QkQk7xEE  
